(albeit in some cases lengthy) increase in the level of violence in the country or society.
What are the types of destruction that occur, and how might they affect women and men differently?
War-related deaths, whether as a direct result of battle or as an indirect result of various systemic breakdowns during or following hostilities (including from higher levels of disease and less treatment of chronic and acute illness), are the ultimate form of destruction, as the person is no longer available to work (whether in the market or nonmarket sector of the economy). Clearly both genders can die due to war; however, men tend to bear the brunt of the death count as they do during "normal" violence as well; men are significantly more likely to be both the murderer and the murdered in country fatality statistics (Jacobsen 2002: 11) . This tends to have a significant effect in some cases on the gender ratio; notably Russia for many years after World War II had a very low ratio of men to women, with only 31 men to every 100 women among those aged 65 and over in 1999 (Jacobsen 2002: Table 19 ).
For those lucky enough to survive, war, war-related disabilities can reduce one's ability to participate in both paid and unpaid work. These can include both physical disabilities such as loss of one or more limbs, and mental disabilities, including post-traumatic stress disorder. Again, men are more likely to suffer such disabilities from direct hostilities in the war as they are more likely to engage in combat. However, Ghobarah et al. (2003) find that death and disability attributable to the indirect and lingering after-effects of civil wars in the 1991-97 period increasing specific diseases and medical conditions, disproportionately affect women and children. As one example, the spread of HIV increases as a result of war, generally starting with mobilized males but eventually spreading to women and children. Untreated HIV, with its high rates of infection among prime-aged adults, is particularly destructive of productive capacity. More generally war can lead to unanticipated physical and mental changes for individuals which are costly in terms of their being able to participate fully in economic activity and reach the same level of well-being during the war or subsequent to the war.
War also tends to depreciate other assets besides labor as capital, land, and other productive inputs-and the markets in which they are traded-are disrupted. While nonfixed capital tends to leave disrupted countries, fixed capital (buildings, much infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and electrical and communications lines) cannot.
For example, according to Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol (2003) , in Mozambique, around forty percent of fixed capital in the agricultural, communications and administrative sector was destroyed, and in Liberia's mid-1990s war, all major infrastructure was damaged (5). To the extent that women own fewer such assets than do men and are less likely to engage in productive activities that utilize infrastructure, they may be less likely to suffer the direct effects of this depreciation. However, since women and men interact in families, women still suffer the indirect effects from depreciation of family assets.
There is a need for research on the relative effects by gender of the destruction of houses, factories, agricultural fertility, and other productive assets.
Even if assets are not damaged or destroyed, if owners and users are separated from these assets then they are unable to make productive use of them during this period of separation, and the assets may require renovation and upkeep when the owners/users return. For example, farmers are not able to tend their farms if they are displaced, and thus can easily miss whole crop cycles and also suffer livestock losses. Persons displaced by conflict, whether refugees or internally displaced, appear to suffer disproportionate and substantial losses relative to the nondisplaced. For example, in the case of civil conflict in Colombia, Ibáñez and Vélez (2008) find that welfare losses from displacement are 37 percent of the net present value of rural lifetime aggregate consumption, with female-headed households slightly more likely to undergo displacement, and Ibáñez and Moya (2010) find that labor income declines by fifty percent in the year after displacement. However, this is another area in which more research is needed to consider the relative effects by gender of displacement related to separation from productive assets.
Another aspect of disruption is the disruption of skill acquisition (which can occur both for the displaced and the nondisplaced). Both formal and informal education can be disrupted during wartime. Ironically, to the extent that men may have been more likely to participate in formal education, this disruption can then affect them disproportionately.
For instance the education system collapse during the Khmer Rouge regime (which can be thought of in part as a protracted period of civil war) meant that those who were of school-going age during that regime had lower educational attainment than the preceding 5 and subsequent cohorts; men were particularly affected, perhaps because they were more likely to attend school in general than were women (de Walque 2006) .
It is also possible that war can lead to development of 'bad', i.e., destructive, skills in lieu of productive skills. For instance, training in military techniques (including extreme ones such as torture) do not have obvious productive uses, and may well make it much more difficult for such trainees to transit to civilian life. Again, while this seems like a more likely scenario for men (as the main participators in military training), more research is needed regarding the gendering of nonproductive labor.
There is possibly some offset of depreciated and disrupted skills if productive skill development comes from maintaining a standing military, or if capital development for war has some peacetime value. There is also some potential offset if newer capital acquired as replacements after the war supplants less productive older capital (particularly if outside funds help rebuild, since countries affected by civil war or outside aggression would have less rather than more funds available for capital investment).
Again, research is needed regarding gender differences in access to and realization of these offsets.
It appears that wartime labor market phenomena are the most studied impacts regarding the effects of war on women. These can be both direct effects on labor markets by which war affects the demand for and supply of female labor, but also indirect effects through demographic changes, i.e., through the supply of and demand for marriage and children and changes in the structure of households. In particular, war, through causing relatively high rates of war-related death and disability rates for men, tends to increase both the supply of and the demand for female labor and thus increases participation in paid labor of women during wartime. Exceptions to this would be cases where labor markets are so disrupted by war that the overall participation of the population in paid labor drops sharply.
The demand effect is that women, as substitutes for male labor, find increased demand for their labor by employers who find that men are in short supply due to their increased level of military participation during wartime. This would be particularly likely in those occupations and industries that are normally male-dominated, including heavier forms of manufacturing. Thus we would predict that women's occupational distribution would change during wartime along with their increased participation in paid work, with many more women entering nontraditional occupations. This also means that women would in general increase their absolute earnings, though their relative earnings relative to those men remaining in paid work (rather than military work) need not rise (particularly if the men who join the military are disproportionately drawn from the lower-paid men in the labor force, as one might expect in voluntary rather than draft circumstances).
The supply effect comes from several sources. In wartime, married women will have less income available to their household from their husband or partner. This can be because the husband is dead or disabled or away fighting, or because the husband is less able to find productive work or utilize fully his productive assets during wartime. Thus women will be interested in engaging in paid work to compensate in part for this loss of household income. Women may also have reduced nonmarket work responsibilities during wartime when the husband (and possibly other family members) are away. This also frees up time for them to spend in paid work Some women may, however, have increased nonmarket/household responsibilities if they have to care for more dependents while other able-bodied workers are away. This extra housework burden may be picked up in part by those women less likely to enter or reenter the workforce, such as grandmothers and young girls. Other women, due to postponed or preempted marriage as fewer marriageable men remain in their area, again have more freedom to work outside the home due to fewer household work responsibilities while they stay single. The supply of female labor to paid work is also increased through reduced fertility rates, at least during wartime (since some may be postponed fertility rather than preempted fertility). This occurs both through the postponement or preemption of marriage and, for those women already married, the absence of the husband. Thus again women's nonmarket work responsibilities will generally be lightened with fewer children to care for, and thus this frees up more of their time to take on paid work. Thus economic theory tends to support the premise that women will participate in greater numbers in paid labor during wartime, again subject to the caveat that sufficient labor demand (i.e., functioning labor markets) exists.
A final consideration regarding productive capacity that affects women predominantly is wartime rape and increased trafficking in sex. As the Economist (2011) documents, while rape is as old as war itself, the increased reporting of the crime has made its scale more apparent, as well as its associated damages. In addition to unwanted pregnancies, women experience physical and emotional scarring that can make it difficult to engage in productive work. The fear of rape and the desire to avoid it can also lead to additional displacement of populations and thus indirectly reduce productivity as well. A more complicated issue would be increased incentives for prostitution during wartime; while compulsory prostitution and other forms of sexual slavery are clearly negative, the economics of prostitution are such that women often engage in it because they are unable to earn comparable money otherwise. Thus, while high rates of prostitution signal a lack of viable other options for women to earn money, they also provide some needed funds during times of social breakdown such as war. This is a difficult issue to analyze that again requires more research from a feminist perspective.
The economic effects of war: measurement
While the preceding section has listed inclusive categories of effects of war that can lead to societal costs, an ongoing research challenge is calculating the extent of these costs.
Data limitations abound, particularly given the difficulty of carrying out systematic data collection during wartime in affected countries. Wars' effects are generally going to be negative for most people involved, although some individuals may prosper as markets for their services expand during conflict, such as wartime racketeers and others who do relatively better in black markets and other less lawful situations. Still, the average economic effects of war can be measured for individuals, households, and whole societies. These measurements are often of negative matters, such as income and earnings drops and casualties, but can also be neutral or mixed measures, such as changes in female labor force participation rates, and changes in occupational and industrial gender segregation.
While some economists have attempted to measure the overall costs of war on affected countries, these estimates have not been calculated separately for different demographic groups. Nonetheless, these estimates show that there are substantial losses to the economy; for instance, in the case of civil war, the average costs are in the range of one to three percent lower growth in per capita real gross domestic product per annum (Ra and Singh 2005 , Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol 2003 , Imai and Weinstein 2000 , Collier 1999 ).
Regarding gender differences in impact, more attention has been paid to the relatively neutral or mixed measures of women's labor force participation. While women have always participated in wartime mobilizations, this was either a relatively routine part of their activities in highly belligerent societies or ongoing periods of sustained warfare, or was more limited due to the smaller scale of war (or its confinement to the military rather than civilian population). The US Civil War, with its large scale, sustained length and high proportion of male population involvement, did see more significant changes in women's participation patterns, including their entry into previously male-dominated occupations. In WWI, women in the UK participated significantly in the wartime mobilization, working by the thousands in munitions factories and by the millions in many other paid and volunteer positions. However, formal agreements with the British trade unions required women to withdraw from many skilled positions after the war to return those positions to male veterans' hands. In addition, many women worked as military nurses and also in other support positions such as stenography and telephone operation. Most other countries' labor markets were less affected in these ways than Britain's' so that women's formal work involvement was less noted in them.
The scale of WWII and the large degree of involvement for many countries led to a large shift in gendered employment patterns during the war. In the US, as men were conscripted and production of war-related goods increased, women entered manufacturing in large numbers. War industries hired 1.3 million women of the 2.5 million who entered the labor force for the first time, as well as hiring about 700,000 out of other industries (Chafe 1972: 142) . Nonfamily child care became available for the first time on a widespread basis, as factories producing war-related products set round-theclock child care centers so that women could work full time, including swing shifts.
Women's wages rose relative to male wages and occupational sex segregation diminished temporarily as women entered higher-paid manufacturing jobs and the increased number of military support positions (Milkman 1987) .
Many European countries involved in WWII experienced similar patterns of increased female labor force participation as well as female participation in the war effort. While the statistics are not as researched as for the US, it is documented that women participated in military functions for many countries, including in front line positions in Russia, and German women served in the domestic defense corps (though German women were also urged to produce children for the Reich, so their labor force involvement was still more limited than in the US).
On the demographic front, WWII caused a large drop in marriage and fertility rates during the war years, followed by a substantial rise in both directly following the war, as well as a sustained baby boom for the next decade and a half. Hence the indirect effects on female labor force participation through lowered marriage and fertility during the war did not appear to be sustained.
What about the measurable economic effects of recent civil wars in smaller countries?
While the overall scale of war is smaller than for a world war, the relative impact can be much larger on the particular country. Then all effects are concentrated in one country, and a large proportion of the country's population can be directly affected. On the other hand, it may also be easier for people to move to an unaffected area outside the country as compared to widespread violence like a World War. This would allow for some strategic migration and also potentially lead to different migration patterns by gender.
Again, most studies of the economic effects of post-WWII conflicts have not put particular focus on their gender-differentiated effects. A recent important exception is Menon and Rodgers (2011) , who carry out an in-depth study of the effects of Nepal's 1996-2006 civil conflict (Maoist-led insurgency) on women's employment. They find that in both 2001 and 2006, women are significantly more likely to be working, both in formal employment and self-employment, than at the beginning of the conflict period. Rena (2007) considers the recent war of independence in Eritrea. There again women have been increasingly likely to become the head of household and to participate in the economy, but they are still clustered in the lower-productivity and/or lower status occupations. But in addition, there was substantial fertility decline in Eritrea over the latter few years of the twentieth century due to the reduction of male presence, though it is not clear that this will lead to a sustained drop in fertility (Blanc 2004 ). De Walque (2006 found in the case of post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia that fertility and marriage rates recovered quickly from their very low levels during the Khmer Rouge era, in part because the age and education differences between partners declined to offset the shortage of eligible men.
Researchers have recently called attention to the pattern that more recent conflicts have been leading to substantial numbers of displaced civilians and human trafficking. Akee et al. (2010) document that these displacements occur and that trafficking disproportionately affects women and children. Kondylis (2010) considers the early 1990s civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where some 1.3 million people were displaced, and finds that displaced Bosnians are less likely to be working relative to the people who stayed, and that, while displaced men have higher unemployment levels, displaced women are more likely to leave the labor force.
Overall, we know very little about the extent of economic impacts during wartime and what their gendered dimensions consist of, in terms of the relative costs borne by women 13 and girls relative to men and boys. Hopefully more gender-disaggregated calculations of the costs of war will be generated in the future (including for older conflicts).
Economic effects in the aftermath of war
Up until this point we have been primarily concentrating on economic effects that occur during the war itself, or in its immediate aftermath. But the more interesting research problem may be to try to estimate the longer-run effects of wars on affected countries and individuals. These would include a number of observables, including demographic effects as discussed above (marriage market changes, changes in fertility patterns) and permanent alterations in labor and other factor markets, including permanently raised levels of female labor force participation (through either the direct effect of its increasing during the war, or through the indirect effects on demographic variables). Postwar changes may be temporary or sustained, such as fertility drops that may either be largely offset by increased fertility after hostilities cease, or that signal a significant social shift downwards. For instance, increased female labor supply might persist after the war ends for many of the same reasons that it increased during the war: fewer nonmarket responsibilities due to fewer men, fewer marriages, fewer children. For instance, in cases such as Russia, where the male population was decimated, it is certainly believable that this would cause long-lasting changes in economic outcomes through both direct and indirect effects. The ultimate goal would be to calculate the long-run effects of war, for instance whether it alters economic growth rates for many years after the war ends, and if so, by how much. In addition, it would be interesting to see if the economic balance between women and men becomes permanently altered following conflict.
But in addition to these continued direct and indirect effects that are comparable to the phenomena discussed above that occur during war, war can serve as the agency of change in gender relations in more systemic ways:. First, either during war or in the aftermath of war, women and men (and children) may be exposed to new ideas that lead to either changes in preferences or changes in social norms. For example, from their wartime work experience, women may discover that they both like and have the ability to do different types of work than they had traditionally performed. In addition, men may discover that women can do new types of work that they had not previously thought that women could do. Thus the very novelty of war and the changes that it forces can be an agent for change as women and men are pushed out of their usual roles into new unfamiliar roles, thus forcing involuntary 'learning by doing' and learning by observation as well. For example, the 'Rosie the Riveter' stereotype from WWII implies the very strength of women in taking on a traditionally male job and performing it well, thus providing positive reinforcement of a new expanded view of women's capabilities for both women and men to see.
Second, it is possible that war can lead towards redistribution either towards or away from women. This can be as an outcome of changes in the political and/or social system, but also as an indirect effect through changes in factor markets, particularly the labor market. For example, if women increase their labor force representation and move into higher-paying jobs and occupations as a consequence of having entered the labor force during the war, then they may end up with relatively better economic outcomes relative to men after the war. They may also de facto increase their representation due to the continued absence of men (due to casualties, migration, or imprisonment) subsequent to the war. This appears to have happened in Russia after WWII. On the other hand, redistribution could easily turn against women's favor as well. For instance, if women are more likely to be displaced than are men, they may lose relatively more access to productive assets such as land and cattle and thus end up in worsened economic status relative to men. Also, to the extent that women are highly dependent on male partners' incomes, the loss of these incomes during the war can be hard to replace and will tend to make them worse off. Of course men are also worse off then, and so then it becomes a race to the bottom to see which group ends up being hurt relatively more. This race to the bottom appears particularly likely in cases where large groups are displaced during wartime, such as in a number of recent African conflicts.
Third, it is possible that through the destruction of older structures and institutions in society that women will become in general either better or worse off. Improvements in women's situations might be particularly likely in cases where the older societal structure is patriarchal. Thus even a situation where there is no particular structure being enforced at all can be preferable to continuation of the prewar structure as women might experience greater economic and social freedom. For instance, the mid-twentieth century in China was a period of political fragmentation before Mao took over, but women's position still likely improved relative to the older (pre-1912) dynastic regime.
Alternatively of course, if the social structure were relatively gender-equal, then women might well be worse off if these structures are destroyed. The loss of rule of law may be particularly problematic for women, who may then be more likely to be the victim of domestic violence and rape without potential reprisal. For instance, continuing unrest in Zimbabwe makes it difficult for rules to be enforced, even though laws have been passed to improve women's land rights. Finally, it is also possible that through the imposition of new structures and institutions in society that women will become in general either better or worse off. Note that this can be replacing a previous structure or coming into a void caused by war in which no particular social structure was enforced. Many would consider for instance that the 1979 revolution in Iran, leading to the deposition of the Shah and the installation of the current Islamic republic under Ayatollah Khomeini, was a major setback for women's political and economic status. The Afghan civil war provides another such example. On the other hand, the subsequent removal of the Taliban government in Afghanistan was an improvement in women's status (though not yet back to the levels experienced, at least by upper class, highly educated women, before the civil war).
So theoretically, as an consequence of war, gender equality could increase, decrease, or display little or no change depending on whether the older or newer structure is more or less paternalistic, and the overall direction of redistribution between the genders due to both direct and indirect effects on factor markets. Thus, since theory provides no strong predictions regarding outcomes, it is informative to examine the historical record to see what has happened following various wars and to consider what factors make it more or less likely that women will be positively affected.
It is not clear yet exactly what preconditions make it more or less likely that women will come out with a more positive outcome following conflict. Meintjes et al. (2002) argue that gender change must be facilitated during the conflict phase in order to lead to more favorable outcomes in the post-conflict phase. It is also not clear if dynamics internal to a country are significantly affected by outside intervention during the modern era.
Peksen (2011) 
Economic effects in the aftermath of war: measurement
As with calculating the extent and distribution of costs during war, it is a research challenge to calculate the ongoing costs and potential benefits following war's conclusion that can be attributed to either the war directly or to the regime change that it may have entailed. Similar measures of particular types of effects can be used, including changes in income and earnings, and changes in female labor force participation and work segregation. This is yet again a severely under researched area in economics, with a range of case study-based evidence that is indicative of some outcomes in particular countries' cases, but no overall calculation or of when and why there are positive or negative net effects on women relative to men.
Again, given data limitations, researchers often focus on phenomena that are more easily observed but which do not yield an exact calculation of gains or losses. For instance, one observable phenomenon is the opening of new occupations to women, particularly if they were barred by law or hiring practice prior to wartime. For example, the US Civil War labor shortage led to the first hiring of female clerks as government employees (Davies 1982) . Among domestic workers, there was also increased substitution of male (and female) blacks for white workers after the Civil War (Bertaus 1991 ).
Again, due to the size and extent of the War, the post WWII period entailed a big adjustment in those countries heavily involved in the war. In the US, the end of the war did lead to wholesale reduction of female industrial employment, both voluntary and involuntary, as men returned from their wartime roles, but in states with greater mobilization of men, women continued to work more after the war (Acemoglu et al. 2004 ). However, while the late 1940s and early 1950s marked an apparent return of women to the home, such as the drop in age at first marriage and rise in fertility, other trends that had been present before the war's onset continued and even accelerated, including the rises in divorce and married women's employment. While the majority of wartime entrants exited between 1944 and 1950, half of all married women who were working in 1950 had also been working in 1940, and half of the 1940s' married women labor force entrants joined after the war (Goldin 1991) . Thus the view of this period as a watershed in gender relations (cf. Chafe 1972: 195) has come into question, with other commentators contending that the rise in women's labor supply after WWII is due primarily to longer-run factors, including increased clerical employment and female education (Goldin 1991:755) . Indeed, the decade-to-decade trend in female labor force participation shows no particular blip related to WWII but rather steady increase from 1930 to 1960 (and beyond), with female labor force participation at 22.0 percent in 1930 , 25.4 percent in 1940 , 30.9 percent in 1950 , and 34.9 percent in 1960 (Jacobsen 2007 .1). Meanwhile the gender wage ratio remained fairly constant at around .60 or lower over the mid-twentieth century, so relative demand for female labor apparently did not outstrip supply. Overall indexes of occupational gender segregation also remain fairly constant throughout this period; apparently the increased demand for female labor arose more in the growing areas of clerical and office work rather than in the manufacturing sector so that increased numbers of female workers did not increase gender integration of the workforce.
An interesting contrast to the post-WWII US case of increased work participation is found in Germany (particularly the Western part). Germany was heavily bombed during World War II, with an estimated forty percent of the total housing stock destroyed nationwide. Since many of the men were gone (dead, wounded, or still returning from prison camps), it fell mainly to women to begin the reconstruction process, including the arduous task of removing the rubble. Mandatory work brigades were set up for ablebodied women to aid in the removal. In an interesting paper, Akbulut-Yuksel et al. In the case of Russia, where there was a significant shortage of men (due not only to WWII, but also to WWI, the Russian Revolution, and the later Stalinist purges), women made major inroads into the crafts and professions. However, their earnings ratio still did not rise noticeably, nor was it higher than in Western Europe. East Germany, however, which operated under socialist rule as well, did notably better in terms of closing the gender gap. In contrast both with nonsocialist West Germany and with socialist Russia, East German women had higher female labor force participation rates in the decades following WWII (up through the end of the socialist era in the early 1990s) and were much less likely to work part-time than their Western European counterparts. They also attained high educational levels and their employment had a broad occupational and industrial distribution. These conditions appear to have been enabled to a large degree by the heavy use of institutionalized child care and other support services that replaced women's traditional nonmarket activities. There was extensive availability of preschools and nurseries, and many services, including laundry and hot meals, were available at workplaces. While women in East Germany worked long hours in the combined pursuits of paid work and nonmarket work, the East German system nonetheless managed to reconcile their dual pursuits more effectively than the other socialist nations (Jacobsen 2007: Chapter 11) .
In socialist China, major social reorganization began after the 1949 revolution. While aspects of the reorganization, such as farm collectivization, were hard on everyone, it would be difficult to argue that women in China were worse off than before the Communist regime came into power. Again, the relatively widespread availability of child care, institution of paid maternity leave and improvements in health care and education for women, and a general doctrine of gender equality were all innovations relative to the traditional patriarchal Chinese system. Cuba is a final interesting case regarding the post-revolution socialist experience. Here female labor force participation rose substantially following the 1958-59 revolution.
Castro spoke of freeing women from domestic slavery so that they could participate in production so as to benefit themselves and the country, and followed up on that with universal education, government provision of child care, and legislation regarding gender equality. Again it is hard to argue that women in Cuba are worse off than before the regime change in relative terms to men, even if Cuba's relatively low overall economic status has been an outcome of their socialist stance and the resulting US embargo.
More recent conflicts have offered up more cases of potentially negative effects on women than in the immediate post-WWII era. There are cases where regime change has brought in a clearly more paternalistic regime, such as Afghanistan and Iran. The cases where this has been related to installation of a Muslim fundamentalist regime indicates a misreading of Islam, which is not inherently patriarchal. It may also be that cases like Afghanistan indicate a reversion to an older tribal patriarchal structure. such as is found among the Pashtun, which was in abeyance until after the 1980s Soviet War.
Afghanistan is a complicated case because of the series of wars, making it hard to attribute effects to any one conflict or action.
At any rate, these varying case studies indicate that it is difficult to argue that war, in its role in bringing on regime change, is necessarily either good or bad in the long run for women in the affected country or countries. This holistic view of conflict makes it also very hard to calculate the overall net effect of war on either men's or women's well-being, since it is inherently multidimensional and redistributional along many dimensions.
However, taking only the narrow view of conflict as an isolated event which is unmistakably bad, rather than as an unfortunately sometimes necessary evil in bringing on regime change, leads to a concomitantly narrow assessment of the gendered impacts of war.
Conclusion: Much remains to be studied
From this taxonomy of possible effects and overview of partial evidence, the main conclusion one should draw is that much remains to be studied about the economic impacts of war and how they vary by gender. To the extent that research exists, it is fragmented across academic disciplines and published in various sources, making it hard to track down results.
There are numerous related topical areas on which little or nothing has been written. For instance, little is known regarding the effects of the rise of black markets during war and the gender redistributional effects through this mechanism; and the potential increase in importance of nonmarket production and again its potentially different effects on men and women. Both of these mechanisms may actually raise the economic importance of women relative to peacetime due to their higher specialization in nonmarket production (which may be to a degree compatible with participation in black markets as well).
There is also little or no evaluation of third party attempts to mitigate negative changes from war; for example, the gendered effects of spending time in refugee camps, or of being resettled. While there is a recent literature criticizing humanitarian aid on a number of grounds (that it prolongs conflicts, promotes dependency, may help undeserving parties, is subject to waste and duplication of services), there is really no focus in this literature on gender or women qua women, in their roles as either providers or recipients (Rieff 2002 , Terry 2002 , Polman 2010 ; Rieff mentions in passing that some humanitarian groups did not want to support the Taliban in Afghanistan because of their suppression of women's rights).
More broadly, there is little public debate on the ongoing opportunity costs of militarization: what is not funded because we are funding war or maintaining standing armies? A variety of suppositions could be explored regarding what a demilitarized society might instead spend its resources upon, and whether such a society might be a more favorable place for women. Many women and men likely expect that it would be if, for instance, government funds were redirected to provision of other public or private goods.
Thus in conclusion, the only real conclusion that can be drawn at this point is that war is a complex phenomenon and that its gendered implications have been understudied.
Hopefully the next generation of researchers will give more thought to developing a systematic framework for evaluation of the distributional effects of war across demographic groups, as well as working towards the lessening of war's ill effects on all persons through the process of attaining world peace.
